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Managed Competition: Lessons from Britain
Abstract
As phrases like “managed care backlash” become part of the lexicon in American health care policy circles, it is
instructive to examine a managed competition experiment in a vastly different context. Britain’s Conservative
government instituted reforms in 1991 to transform the National Health Service (NHS) from a centrally
administered service to managed competition between purchasers and providers. Five years later, it replaced
those reforms to promote cooperation rather than competition. This Issue Brief summarizes what the NHS
can learn from decades of American experience with purchasing care, and what the American health system
can learn from the British experiment with an internal market in the 1990s.
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Managed Competition: Lessons from Britain
Editor’s Note: As phrases like “managed care backlash” become part of the lexicon in
American health care policy circles, it is instructive to examine a managed competi-
tion experiment in a vastly different context.  Britain’s Conservative government
instituted reforms in 1991 to transform the National Health Service (NHS) from a
centrally administered service to managed competition between purchasers and
providers. Five years later, it replaced those reforms to promote cooperation rather
than competition. This Issue Brief summarizes what the NHS can learn from
decades of American experience with purchasing care, and what the American health
system can learn from the British experiment with an internal market in the 1990s.
The British National Health Service is a government-financed system serving all 50
million residents through more than 100 district health authorities. It provides
universal coverage within set budget limits.
• The NHS contracts with primary care physicians on a low-risk, part-capitation
contract.  It owns its own hospitals, and employs its specialists and other staff on a
salary basis.  It operates on a primary care gatekeeper model, meaning that
patients get access to specialists through their general practitioner (GP).
• About 12% of the population purchases private health insurance that supple-
ments their NHS benefits.  Private insurance offers choice of specialists, avoidance
of queues for elective surgery, and higher standards of comfort and privacy than
the NHS. Private insurance accounts for about 4% of health expenditures.
• Before 1991, the NHS was publicly administered and centrally governed.  The
main budget for hospital and community health care was allocated to district
health authorities, and GPs were paid through a separate, national contract.  This
single bureaucracy was replaced in 1991 with the introduction of competition
within the system.
• Over the previous 40 years, careful planning had created a taut system with
equitable distribution and access, and very little surplus.  Costs were kept at 20%
less than the average for Northern Europe.
The 1991 Thatcher reforms introduced an “internal market” that was meant to
promote competition between purchasers and providers.  Within set budget limits,
the reforms created markets of competitive contracts among doctors and hospitals.
• Purchasers and providers were separated.  District health authorities became
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purchasers of community, secondary and tertiary services, with risk-adjusted
budgets based on the district’s population.
• Hospitals and other providers became sellers or “trusts” with quasi-independent
powers (though still part of the NHS).  These providers, in theory, would com-
pete for contracts, but budget surpluses and losses were tightly controlled to avoid
destabilizing the system.
• Larger GP practices (4-8 physicians) were given the option of becoming
“fundholders,” with the power to purchase a defined set of secondary services for
their patients.  Fundholders were given part of the health authorities’ budget to
manage, and were allowed to keep any surpluses (to be spent on upgrading
services or facilities for patients).  Non-fundholding GPs continued on their
national GP contract and bore no risk for secondary services they ordered.
One of the most promising aspects of the 1991 reforms was the potential to have
GPs purchase community and secondary services for their patients.  In theory, it
would allow doctors to be purchasing agents for their patients, and reduce waste in
specialty and hospital medicine.  But in practice:
• About half of GPs did not want to become fundholders, because of ethical or
practical issues; they lacked the time and training for this complex task. Of
fundholding GPs, half indicated that they want to get out of fundholding.
• A national review of fundholders found that only a small minority of practices
realized the potential of fundholding to increase value and quality, while the rest
did little with the power of the purse.  They did not have the technical skills and
infrastructure to challenge ineffective practices. GP fundholders could implement
simple changes such as shifting to generic drugs and bargain hunting, but usually
did not tackle the larger savings that lie in reducing visits or procedures of ques-
tionable effectiveness.
• Fundholding seriously compromised the ability of the health authorities to
purchase equitably for the entire district population and to develop public health
programs. The fundholding practices received part of the health authorities’
budget to purchase the lower-risk, elective 20% of hospital, specialty and commu-
nity health services. The health authorities remained responsible for many high-
cost and community care benefits for the fundholders’ patients.
By most accounts, managed competition did not succeed in reducing inefficiency
and improving quality in the NHS.  When applied to a health care system with
safeguards against cream skimming, cost shifting, and reduced quality, competition
did not work as well as it appears to in the United States.
• Competition created new inefficiencies, costs and dislocations.  The number of
managers in the NHS tripled.  Health care institutions that “lost” in competitive
markets did not shut down quickly; instead, they remained and added to
everyone’s costs.
• Competition is only as effective as the purchasers and the information they have
collected. Due to limited information on costs and quality, health authorities
purchased services in block contracts with hospitals, and little competition for
contracts occurred.
Do primary care doctors
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• Ironically, the introduction of a competitive market led to more government
controls and regulation than the publicly administered system.  The government
dictated the extent of competition to protect the public from the potential
economic and political consequences of institutional closures; government
bailouts assured that few providers failed or left the system.
By spring of 1996, the Conservative government shifted its policies and rhetoric to
“partnership” and “cooperation.” They also integrated separate budgets for primary,
secondary, and community services.  The Labor government has developed these
themes further.
• The new reforms propose to universalize fundholding by requiring GPs to form
“primary care groups” (PCGs), responsible for purchasing all health care for
defined geographic populations of 80,000-100,000 people.  In stages, the entire
risk-adjusted budget will be transferred to PCGs.
• Health authorities will no longer purchase services for a defined population, but
will remain accountable to the central government for how the PCGs perform.
The health authorities will also manage the transition process.
• A national performance framework has been developed.  The reforms shift the
focus from  measuring activity and its efficiency, to a focus on effectiveness,
quality and health gain. Two new national entities will be created: the National
Institute for Clinical Effectiveness, to set standards, and the Council for Health
Improvement, to enforce them.
In Britain, there is a sense that most of the benefits of the 1991 reforms stemmed
from the act of purchasing, and almost all of the disruptions and inequities came
from competitive contracting. But will the new PCGs be effective, knowledgeable
purchasers? Based on the experience of the best American purchasing groups in the
1980s, Light identifies these prerequisites for effective purchasing:
• Purchasing organizations need to be large and strong, with marketplace clout and
a large population base.  Larger groups can better manage and bear risk, especially
for rare, costly cases.  They also can support a skilled team of clinical and financial
managers, and can spread the resulting administrative and transaction costs over a
larger client base. They need data systems that provide good measures of benefits
and quality, as well as costs.
• Purchasers and providers must have some incentives and bear some risk for the
decisions they make.  This risk should be enough to motivate people, but not so
much that they can make (or lose) large sums.
• Primary care itself needs to be purchased effectively. The capacities, clinical
decisions, and inequities of primary care providers determine how equitable and
cost effective the rest of the system is.
Despite radically different health care systems, the United States and Britain have
much to learn from each other.  The experience of large purchasers and managed
care organizations in the U.S. suggests that the National Health Service should:
• Get community-based primary care groups (PCGs) functioning well first, before
they are made responsible for purchasing all secondary services.
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• Reap the benefits of primary care purchasing by making the PCGs advisory to
health authorities, which may be the best structure for effective purchasing of
services.  The GPs (as leaders of the PCGs) could provide local knowledge,
clinical savvy, and professional legitimacy; the health authorities would offer
technical advantages and the clout of a larger purchaser.
The British experiment with managed competition may have implications for U.S.
policymakers as they address the “managed care backlash” and struggle to find the
optimal role for competition within the health care system.
• The British experience raises questions about how much is being saved by compe-
tition per se, and how much only appears saved through cost shifting, short-term
price discounts, and risk selection.
• The British experience highlights the difficulty of implementing real competition
while maintaining safeguards against undertreatment, access barriers and cost
shifting.  U.S. policymakers should consider this as they face the converse prob-
lem of implementing many types of patient protections while maintaining real
competition within the managed care marketplace.
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